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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATION OF EsTATEs-DrscRETION OF CouRT IN APPOINTMENT
OF ADMINISTRATOR CONTRARY TO STATUTORY PREFERENCE-The County •
Court, disregarding the statutory order of preference,1 appointed a disinterested
third party administrator with the will annexed because of th.e conflict of interest
between the grandchildren who were entitled to the appointment under the
statute and the creditors.2 The grandchildren as heirs of the devisees in decedent's will claimed that the creditors' claims were barred by the laches of the
former administrator, their nominee. The circuit court decided that the statute
was mandatory and ordered the appointment of the grandchildren. The creditors appeal. Held, reversed. The original appointment by the county court of
a disinterested person will be affirmed. The order of preference set forth in the
statute " ••• must yield to the discretion of the Court in unusual cases where
considerable hostility, adversity and conflict of interest appear." 3 In re A hell's
Estate, 329 Ill. App. 73, 67 N. E. (2d) 294 (1946).
The language of the Illinois statute would seem to be mandatory 4 and there
is no provision, as ther:e is in the statutes of some of the states, that the preference
shall be observed "unless the court deems it proper to appoint some other person." 11 But the court's solution to the problem would seem to result in the more
efficient handling of the estate. When confron~ed with a somewhat similar
situation in an earlier case, the Illinois Supreme Court passed over one brother
and gave the appointment of administrator with the will annexed to the nominee
of the other brother, although construing the statute as preferring the members
of a class to the nominees of the class. The brother excluded from the administration was excluded by the will from any interest in the estate and the relation1 Ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) c. 3, § 248. "The following persons are
entitled to preference in the following order in obtaining the issuance of letters of administration of the various kinds: .•• (5) The grandchildren or any person nominated
by them •••• (8) A creditor of the estate.
2 This case should be distinguished from the case where administration is denied
to a person with the statutory preference because of an interest hostile to the estate.
8 In re Abell's Estate, 329 Ill. App. 73 at So, 67 N.E. (2d) 294 (1946).
4 See note 1, supra.
11 Mass. Ann. Laws (IC)33) c. 193, § 1. See the application of similar language of
N.D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 8663, " .•• or the court may in its discretion appoint
some suitable and discreet person who is disinterested as between the parties • . . ,"
in Ellis v. Ellis, 42 N.D. 535, 174 N.W. 76 (1919). The statute has been amended
slightly but retains the same effect. N.D. Rev. Code (1943) c. 30, § 0808. Not to be
overlooked in this connection is the possibility that the statute" may provide as does
the Washington Statute [Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington, 1932) §§ 1422, 1444], that
the court shall have discretion in the removal of administrators. Where there is such
a provision the court would seem to have discretion in its appointment. As to hostile
feelings being a basis for removal under such a statute see Estate of Pike, Kimball's
Appeal, 45 Wis. 391 (1878).
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ship between the brothers was hostile.6 The reasonable explanation of the Supreme Court of Washington in passing over the children and appointing a
stranger administrator under an equally mandatory statute 7 was that "The appointment of any one of the children as administrator would result in litigation
and defeat the very purpose of administration, which is to preserve the estate
and cause it to pass to the heirs and distributees without waste or loss, and without delay." 8 Other states have rendered similar opinions, usually in cases where
the element of personal antagonism was more important than in the principal
case. 9 Decisions to the effect that the provisions of such a statute as the one
construed in the principal case are mandatory can be distinguished on the basis
that the fact situations do not present a bitter conflict of interest among those
contending for appointment as administrator. 10
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Dennis v. Dennis, 323 Ill. App. 328, 55 N.E. (2d) 527 (1944).
Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington, 1932) § 1431.
8 In re Estate of Thomas, 167 Wash. 127 at 134, 8 P. (2d) 963 (1932).
9 Smith v. Lurty, 107 Va. 548, 59 S.E. 403 (1907); State ex rel. Flick v. Reddish, 148 Mo. App. 715, 129 S.W. 53 (1910); Warner's Estate, 207 Penn. 580, 57 A.
35 (1904). Wilhelmina Schmidt's Estate, 183 Penn. 129, 38 A. 464 (1897).
10 In re Webb's Estate, 90 Colo. 470, IO P. (2d)" 947 (1932); Parker v.
Batchelor, 40 Ga. App. 669, 151 S. E. II8 (1929); Welsh v. Manwaring, 120 Wis.
377, 98 N.W. 214 (1904); Cooper v. Cooper, 43 Ind. App. 620, 88 N.E. 341
(1909); _¥oran v. Moran's Admr., 172 Ky. 343, 189 S.W. 248 (1916); Buckner's
Admr. v. Buckner, 120 Ky. 596, 87 S.W. 776 (1905).
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